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ARGUMENT 
I. GETTLING WAS ILLEGALLY DETAINED, AND THE 
SUBSEQUENT SEARCH OF HIS PERSONAL PROPERTY 
WAS ILLEGAL 
Subsequent to briefing in this matter the United States Supreme Court issued a 
decision in Arizona v. Johnson, 129 S.Ct. 781 (2009). 
Johnson was a passenger in a vehicle stopped for a traffic violation. At the time of 
the stop, police had no reason to suspect the vehicle's occupants were guilty of other 
criminal activity. The vehicle had three occupants and there were three officers present. 
The occupants were instructed to keep their hands visible. They were also asked about 
the presence of weapons and all responded in the negative. Id at 784. 
While one officer was getting the driver's license and registration/insurance 
information on the vehicle, another officer attended to Johnson. She observed he was 
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wearing clothing that was consistent with gane membership, and that he had a seamier in 
his jacket pocket. She wanted to question Johnson away from the other passenger m 
order to learn more about any possible gang membership, so she asked him to get out of 
the car. He complied. Because she suspected he may have a weapon on him, she patted 
him down for officer safety. She felt the butt of a gun near his waist. He began to 
straggle and was placed in handcuffs. Johnson was charged with possession of a weapon 
by a restricted person. M a t 784-85. 
After the Arizona Court of Appeals reversed Johnson's conviction, the United 
States Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed the judgment of the Arizona Court 
of x^ppeals and remanded the case back to that court for further proceedings. Id at 785, 
788. 
The specific issue the U.S. Court addressed was the "authority of police officers to 
'stop and frisk' a passenger in a motor vehicle temporarily seized upon police detection 
of a traffic infraction." Id. at 784. The Court unanimously concluded that: 
A lawful roadside stop begins when a vehicle is pulled over for 
investigation of a traffic violation. The temporaiy seizure of driver and passengers 
ordinarily continues, and remains reasonable, for the duration of the stop. 
Normally, the stop ends when the police have no further need to control the scene, 
and inform the driver and passengers they are free to leave. See Brendlin [v. 
California, 551 U.S. 249, 258, 127 S.Ct. 2400, 168 L.Ed.2d 132 (2007)]. 
An officer's inquiries into matters unrelated to the justification for the 
traffic stop, this Court has made plain, do not convert the encounter into 
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something other than a lawful seizure, so long as those inquiries do not 
measurably extend the duration of the stop. See Muehler v. Mena. 544 U.S. 93, 
100-101, 125 S.Ct. 1465, 161 L Ed.2d 299 (2005). 
Johnson, 129 S.Ct. at 788. 
Gettlmg asserts that this case is factually distinct from Johnson. In Johnson, the 
frisk which resulted in the discovery of the gun, was done while another officer was 
speaking with the driver of the vehicle and was obtaining a driver's license and 
information on the vehicle's registration and insurance. Johnson, 129 S.Ct. at 784-85. 
Accordingly, the traffic stop was ongoing and the questioning and pat down of Johnson 
did not measurably extend the duration of that stop. 
In this case, however, the opposite is true. Here, the vehicle was stopped for lane 
violations (R. 194: 11). But by the time the vehicle was searched and drugs were 
discovered, the driver of the vehicle was airested due to outstanding warrants and had 
been placed in a patrol car (R. 194: 6-7). Officer Radmall testified: 
I arrested the driver [Steve Canals], removed him from the vehicle, placed 
him in mine. I went back and advised both occupants of the vehicle that I was 
going to run my dog. I'm a K9 handler. I was going to run the K9 around the 
vehicle. I noticed a little bit of furtive movement from Mr. Gettling. He acted 
nervous about it. 
I noticed when I placed the other individual in my vehicle he was doing 
some kind of movement in the backseat. At that point, I decided to remove them 
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both from the vehicle. I had a UVSC officer backing me up. 1 had them stand off 
with her while 1 did the K9 sniff 
(R. 194: 6-7). Gettling's movements caused Radmall concerns over weapons and officer 
safety (R. 194: 22, 24, 25). After Childs and Gettling exited the vehicle, they were patted 
them down for weapons, then had them stand by the other officer (R. 194: 24. 25. 26). 
Radmall admitted that at Childs and Gettling were not free to leave (R. 194: 14). 
The dog alerted on two different locations and Radmall spoke with the vehicle's 
owner (the other passenger, Amber Childs) and told her he would be having the dog 
search the inside of the vehicle (R. 194: 7-8). Childs "said she was fine with it... there 
shouldn't be anything in the car" (R. 194. 8). The dog indicated on the backseat of the 
vehicle, beneath some luggage. Radmall removed the luggage and underneath found a 
hard glass case. He opened it and found paraphernalia and methamphetamine (R. 194: 
8). Childs and Canals denied ownership. When Gettling was questioned about it, he 
said, "Don't make me tell you. Don't make me say it." Gettling also asked Radmall to 
remove some items from the luggage to give to Childs (R. 194: 10). 
When Canals was arrested on the outstanding warrants, no drugs had been located 
(R. 194: 12). Moreover, at that time Radmall had no reason to believe that any of the 
vehicle's occupants was using drags (Id.). Defense counsel then asked, "And so, at that 
point, you went to do a search of the vehicle pursuant to the arrest of Mr. Canals?" (R. 
194: 12). Radmall replied, "Actually, I did a free air sniff of the vehicle" (R. 194: 12). 
Radmall explained the "free air sniff as follows: "A free air sniff is that I have the right 
to walk my dog around the vehicle. The air around the vehicle is free. I don't have to 
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have probable cause to do that. On a stop I already made an arrest out of, and there was 
no legal way for them to remove that vehicle, neither one of them [Childs and Gettlmg] 
had driver's licenses, that vehicle is free for me to walk my K9 around at any time'* (R. 
194: 20). 
Gettling asserts that the lawful traffic stop should have ended with the arrest of the 
driver, Steve Canals. At this point, Gettlmg should not have been further detained, but 
should have been free to leave the scene. At this stage, there was no reasonable suspicion 
of other criminal activity. He could have been patted down for weapons—as he was—in 
order to allay any concerns for officer safety. Officer Radmalfs inquiry into matters 
unrelated to the justification for the traffic stop—his free air sniff of the vehicle and 
subsequent sniff inside the vehicle, done while Gettling was still detained, measurably 
extended the duration of the stop, and therefore, constitute an unlawful detention. 
Moreover, the K9 search/sniff of the vehicle in this case is similarly not allowable under 
Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 407-08, 125 S.Ct. 834, 160 L.Ed.2d 842 (2005), 
because in this case, the deployment of the K9 impermissibly expanded the scope of 
detention. 
Accordingly, because the detention of Gettling exceeded what is allowable under 
Johnson, this Court should reverse his conviction and the denial of his motion to 
suppress. 
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CONCLUSION AND RELIEF SOUGHT 
For the foregoing reasons, the defendant respectfully requests thrs court to reverse 
the denial of his motion to suppress and vacate his conditional Seiy plea, and remand this 
case to the Fourth District Court for further proceedings. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 17th day of February, 2009. 
Margaret P. Lindsa 
Counsel for Appenant 
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